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Results on GNSS spoofing mitigation using multiple receivers / Niklas Stenberg in Navigation : journal of the Institute of navigation, vol 69 n° 1 (Spring 2022)  

Public [article]  inNavigation : journal of the Institute of navigation > vol 69 n° 1 (Spring 2022) . - n° 510 Titre : Results on GNSS spoofing mitigation using multiple receivers Type de document : Article/Communication Auteurs : Niklas Stenberg, Auteur ; Erik Axell, Auteur ; Jouni Rantakokko, Auteur ; et al., Auteur Année de publication : 2022 Article en page(s) : n° 510 Note générale : bibliographie Langues : Anglais (eng) Descripteur : [Vedettes matières IGN] Traitement du signal [Termes IGN] atténuation du signal [Termes IGN] bruit (théorie du signal) [Termes IGN] détection de leurrage [Termes IGN] détection du signal [Termes IGN] double différence [Termes IGN] erreur de phase [Termes IGN] leurrage [Termes IGN] mesurage de pseudo-distance [Termes IGN] récepteur GNSS Résumé : (auteur) GNSS receivers are vulnerable to spoofing attacks in which false satellite signals deceive receivers to compute false position and/or time estimates. This work derives and evaluates algorithms that perform spoofing mitigation by utilizing double differences of pseudorange or carrier phase measurements from multiple receivers. The algorithms identify pseudorange and carrier-phase measurements originating from spoofing signals, and omit these from the position and time computation. The algorithms are evaluated with simulated and live-sky meaconing attacks. The simulated spoofing attacks show that mitigation using pseudoranges is possible in these tests when the receivers are separated by five meters or more. At 20 meters, the pseudorange algorithm correctly authenticates six out of seven pseudoranges within 30 seconds in the same simulator tests. Using carrier phase allows mitigation with shorter distances between receivers, but requires better time synchronization between the receivers. Evaluations with live-sky meaconing attacks show the validity of the proposed mitigation algorithms. Numéro de notice : A2022-821 Affiliation des auteurs : non IGN Thématique : POSITIONNEMENT Nature : Article DOI : 10.33012/navi.510 En ligne : https://doi.org/10.33012/navi.510 Format de la ressource électronique : URL article Permalink : https://documentation.ensg.eu/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=101989 [article]